博客來The primary players in the 1964 decision to increase United States troop levels in Vietnam agreed that pacification was instrumental to success. Under Ambassador Lodge’s leadership, pacification efforts by civilian agencies failed to capitalize on the initial stability provided by significant troop increases. Once this initial window of stability was missed, the United States continued focus on conventional threats prevented a shift to counter insurgency. By looking at the telegram and memorandum traffic among the Johnson Administration and between the Administration and the Vietnam Embassy, indications of Ambassador Lodge’s leadership style and reluctance to change offer clues to the cause. The Administration forced consecutive reorganization efforts to produce pacification success. But the failure was in the man in charge and not the organizational structure.
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