The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism: Neuroethics and Seeming States

Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology of moral intuitionism.

His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience.

Hossein Dabbagh is Assistant Professor in Applied Ethics at New College of the Humanities, Northeastern University London, UK, and Philosophy Tutor at the University of Oxford’s Department for Continuing Education, UK.