This study addresses the issue of social solidarity in environmental liability, with the primary aim of seeking the effectiveness of this constitutional principle when applying it to issues involving environmental damage. The very definition of the environment as a good protected by the Law lacks precision and consensus among scholars on the subject. As a consequence, environmental damage and the causal relationship between the agent and the damage, essential elements of civil liability, suffer from the same nature of these questions. It is necessary to analyse it in the light of the constitutional text, which distinguishes the environment as a legal asset from the asset over which property rights are exercised. Considering that the relationship between human activities, environmental impact and the risk of damage is increasingly evident, the vigilance and attitude of looking after this legal asset of humanity is a common duty for all of us. Thus, if our legacy can condemn or sustain future generations, social solidarity based on the principle of the dignity of human life applied to cases of environmental damage seems to be the most appropriate.