inata

Why are some constitutional monarchies allowed to survive and hols substantial political power even though they might fail to commit to non-interference? How do some constitutional monarchies intervene in democratic politics despite the lack of formal channels to do so?

While constitutional monarchs tend to be considered as powerless, unselfish, and politically neutral and hence received little scholarly attention, Monarchies in the Contemporary World sheds fresh light on the significance of monarchs as one of the primary political agents during and even after the process of regime transformation. Inata argues that monarchs’ popularity or military strength alone is insufficient for the survival of monarchies but that the survival of powerful constitutional monarchs can be rational given the risk of civil disobedience in the future. This book also shows that despite the lack of de jure punishment mechanisms against monarchs (e.g. abolition, abdication), de facto punishment mechanisms by the public can prevent constitutional monarchs from indiscriminately intervene in politics. Drawing on a multi-method approach that combines an original dataset on monarchical powers, formal models, and case studies, this book examines the causes and consequences of the survival of constitutional monarchies, opening up a new perspective to think about the issue of monarchical accountability.

Kana Inata, Associate Professor, Department of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan University

Kana Inata is Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Law at Tokyo Metropolitan University in Japan. She earned a Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Essex in 2019. Her research interests lie in comparative politics, authoritarian politics, regime change, protests, and political institutions. Her work has been published in various journals, including Conflict Management and Peace Science, Public Choice, Peace and Conflict Studies, and Asian Journal of Comparative Politics.