Vieira Da Rocha

The 1988 Constitution opened up a model of broad political and legal participation. By increasing the number of actors entitled to bring cases before the country’s highest court, the Federal Supreme Court, the competitive political process also expanded. Actions by governors against their respective legislative assemblies grew and became central. But if, for much of political science, the executive branch would play a leading role in the decision-making process, then why would governors be at the center of the actions? This book investigates the profile of these actions and how the political-institutional dynamics occur in the states. The more competitive the party system, the more costly it is for the executive branch to maintain its preponderance. The opposite is also true. In less competitive environments, the executive branch has less need to use ADINs. With these propositions, we aim to bring to the fore the debate on the political-legal competition that exists in the states and its consequences for the consolidation of our democratic system.